

- (g) How can cognitive architectures, connectionist models, and other computational theories of cognition aid the study of intuitive organizational decision making?
- (h) How can the rational analysis approach from the cognitive and decision sciences (e.g., Anderson, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 1998) be useful for studying intuitive decision making in organizations?
- (i) When should correspondence criteria and when should coherence criteria (e.g., Hammond, 1996) come into play as normative yardsticks for assessing the success of intuitive decisions in organizations?
- (j) How do intuitive decision making processes differ depending on whether they are studied in the wild or in the lab?
- (k) How can the Brunswikian methodological imperative of representative experimental design (e.g., Brunswik, 1955) be applied in the study of intuitive organizational decision making?
- (l) How can the different theoretical and methodological approaches to intuitive organizational decision making be integrated into an overarching framework?

Interested contributors are requested to contact Julian Marewski and Ulrich Hoffrage (by e mail: julian.marewski@unil.ch, ulrich.hoffrage@unil.ch; for more information about the guest editors, see www.modeling-adaptive-cognition.org) and to submit, as a preliminary step, a summary of the intended contribution (about 200 words). Each summary will be evaluated by the guest editors in terms of the intended contribution's scope and suitability for the special issue. Summaries that are submitted prior to December 31<sup>st</sup> will be given full consideration for the special issue; summaries that are submitted on a later date will also be considered; however, full consideration of late summaries will only be guaranteed as long as projected number of intended contributions does not exceed the available journal space. The deadline for submitting full papers is October 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013. Submitted papers will be reviewed within 4 weeks after their reception.

All submissions will be subject to the journal's regular peer review process under the direction of the guest editors and Ronald Fisher, the journal's editor-in-chief. The final version of accepted articles must adhere to the journal's author guidelines.

One goal of the *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition* is to reach not only scientists but also professionals and practitioners who seek to understand, apply, and benefit from research on memory and cognition. Editorial board members are JR. Belli, R. Bjork, N. Brewer, S. Charman, J. Dunlosky, R. Engle, B. Fischhoff, M. Garry, S. Gathercole, M. Goldsmith, P.A. Granhag, A. Healy, P. Hertel, S. Kassin, G. Keren, J. Marewski, M. McDaniel, C. Meissner, J. Metcalfe, K. Pezdek, D. Poole, H. Roediger III, B. Schwartz, N. Schwarz, D. Simon, B. Spellman, A. Vrij, G. Wells, C. Wickens, J. Wixted, and D. Wright. The journal is owned by the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, and published by Elsevier.

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## Philosophical Approaches to Social Neuroscience

### Special Issue of Cognitive Systems Research

Edited by

Leslie Marsh (Medical School, University of British Columbia) and Philip Robbins (Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri)

### Confluence of Interest

It's been twenty-five years or so since Gazzaniga's (1985) empirically motivated work that understood the brain as a kind of hermeneutic device or "interpreter" that evolved in response to social forces. This work could be considered a landmark in the nascent field of social neuroscience (SN). From a philosophical perspective it's also been some twenty-five years since Churchland (1986) broke ranks with the priorism characteristic of the prevailing philosophy of mind by taking heed of developments within neuroscience.

Social neuroscience, by definition, is an acknowledgement that the nervous system cannot be considered in isolation from the social environments in which humans have evolved. By the same token, the non-Cartesian wing of cognitive science is also a de facto acknowledgement that ubiquitous sociality must be factored into philosophy of mind. This said, there is still a very limited literature dealing with this clear

confluence of interest. Of course, social neuroscience is not totally unknown to philosophy – possibly the most famous instance being the work of Gallese et al (1996), given philosophical currency via Gallese and Goldman (1998). But given the diversity of research projects that drive social neuroscience and “situated” philosophy of mind, the possible topics of philosophical investigation go well beyond mirror neurons.

The motivation behind this special issue is to harvest some of the results from SN with a view to:

- (a) empirically enriching philosophy of mind, and
- (b) philosophically informing social neuroscience.

To this end, we seek philosophical assessments of work being done in and around SN – including (but not limited to) work on mindreading, moral cognition, judgment and decision making, law and testimony, and social epistemology. Contributors are encouraged to scan the contents of two major journals that have social neuroscience as a dedicated interest: *Neuroimaging* (Elsevier) and *Social Neuroscience* (Taylor and Francis) as well as journals that have SN as a major interest, namely *Neuropsychologica* (Elsevier), *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* (MIT), *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (APA) and *Brain Research* (Elsevier).

The list of topics includes empathy, altruism, social pain, attribution, the self, stereotyping (race, gender, etc.), and collective intentionality.

Some overlapping questions for consideration:

- 1) Methodologically speaking, how social is (or can) neuroscience really be if all that is measured is brain activity in non-social contexts, i.e. fMRI scanners? (Keyesers & McKay, 2011). Put another way, does social cognition draw upon a distinct set of processes dissociable from non-social processes? (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011)
- 2) What count as foundational results in SN? (Ochsner, 2004)
- 3) What sort of metaphysical and epistemological commitments does research in SN presuppose? To what extent is SN opposed to reductionism in the philosophy of science? (Decety & Cacioppo, 2010)
- 4) What drives the “techno-ebullience” surrounding neuroimaging in general, and neuroimaging in SN particular, and how might it be problematic for the field? (Vul et al, 2009; Decety & Cacioppo, 2010).

## Timeline

Official start: December 1, 2012  
Final drafts due: February 1, 2014  
Refereeing: February/March 2014  
Final versions due: August 1, 2014

In the first instance we are looking for proposals of not more than 500 words. The aim is to have a broad spread of interest comprising the issue. Final papers should be between 7,500 and 9,000 words. Please send your proposals to both Philip and Leslie:

robbinsp@missouri.edu leslie.marsh@ubc.ca

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